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INTRODUCTION 
 
Constitutional reforms have dominated all political discourse in Africa 
since the current transition from authoritarian to democratic rule started in the 
early 1990s. This so-called “third wave”1 of democratisation has provoked 
African politicians and their constitutional engineers to design and introduce 
new or substantially modified constitutions. In spite of this frantic remodelling 
of constitutions, Africa’s record on constitutionalism has not been a particularly 
good one. Most post-independence constitutions were quickly abrogated or 
easily subverted, suspended or brazenly ignored at the whims of African 
leaders. The new post 1990 constitutions appear to be an attempt not only to 
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1 Samuel Huntingdon coined the expression in, The third wave: Democratization in the 
late twentieth century. Norma, OK, University of Oklahoma Press (1991),  pp 15-16. 
He defines a “wave of democratization” simply as “a group of transitions from non-
democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that 
significantly out-number transitions in the opposite direction during that period.” He 
identifies two previous waves of democratization: a long, slow wave from 1828–1926, 
and a second wave from 1943–1962. Most consider the “third wave” to have started in 
the 1970s, although it only reached African shores in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in 
what Larry Diamond and others such as Julius Ihonvbere and Terisa Turner call 
“second liberation” or “second revolution”.  Larry Diamond, Developing democracy in 
Africa: African and international perspectives, presented at the Workshop on 
Democracy in Africa in comparative perspective, at Stanford University (27April, 
2001), at http://democracy.stanford.edu/Seminar/DiamondAfrica.htm; see also Larry 
Diamond, “Is the third wave over?” 7 Journal of Democracy, (1996), 20, 20–21 and 
Larry Diamond et al (eds), in Consolidating the third wave of democracies. Baltimore, 
John Hopkins University Press (1997); and Julius Ihonvbere and Terisa Turner, 
“Africa’s second revolution in the 1990s,” Security Dialogue (1993), 349-352. 
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break away from the dark era of authoritarianism but also to usher the continent 
into a new era of constitutionalism,2 respect for the rule of law and democracy. 
The existence of an independent judiciary is one of the core elements of 
modern constitutionalism and a cornerstone of democracy and good 
governance. Before 1990, the judiciary in most African countries had been 
reduced into the handmaiden of the various dictatorial regimes in place and was 
thus incapable of operating effectively either as a guardian of the constitution, 
the protector of human rights or an impartial enforcer of the rule of law. 
Judicial independence is now well established as a cardinal feature of the liberal 
democracy3 that many contemporary African regimes purport to have 
established. 
The struggle for judicial independence is occurring throughout the world, 
not only in the transitional democracies in Africa, but also in the advanced 
democracies such as the US, Britain, France, Germany and Japan. This is not 
surprising because judicial independence has never been a condition that is 
established fully or that is enjoyed without debate, controversy or challenge.4 It 
is, like democracy itself, an ideal to which all modern civilised states should 
aspire to attain. It is so fundamental that an American judge has observed that 
“the US Constitution would be just a piece of paper today if there were not 
independent judges to enforce it.”5
Almost all African post-1990 new or revised constitutions provide not only 
for a separation of powers but also for an independent judiciary. Independent 
courts are indeed crucial to the efforts to establish and sustain a constitutional 
ethos and respect for the rule of law in many of the continent’s fragile and 
faltering democracies, where the threat of regression to the dictatorships of 
2 For the meaning of the rather complex concept of “constitutionalism”, see, Charles 
Manga Fombad, “Post 1990 constitutional reforms in Africa and the prospects for 
constitutionalism.” (Forthcoming in A G Nhema and P T Zelaza,  African conflicts: 
Management, resolution and post-conflict   recovery and development; and, Louis 
Henkin, “Elements of constitutionalism,” 60 The Review (1998), 11-22. 
3 For the difference between liberal democracy and other forms of democracy, see, 
Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory. Detroit, Wayne State University Press (1962). 
4 See, Peter H Russell, “Judicial independence in comparative perspective,” in Peter H. 
Russell and David M O’ Brien, Judicial independence in the age of democracy. Critical 
perspectives from around the world. Charlottesville, University of Virginia (2001), at p 
301 
5 See the Hon Richard Arnold, “Should more limits be placed on the federal judiciary: 
No,” Spectrums (1997), at p 29. 
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yesteryears remains potent. One major lesson that can be learnt from post 
World War II Europe is the fact that the bill of rights without some independent 
judiciary is useless against totalitarian dictators.6
This paper examines a number of African constitutions which reflect the 
main Western constitutional models and traditions that have been received on 
the continent to see what the prospects for judicial independence are. Whilst 
recognising the difficulties of making such an assessment, it is contended that 
the prospects for judicial independence, which in turn enhances the prospects 
for constitutionalism and democratic consolidation, are considerably enhanced 
when there are constitutional provisions that entrench this. It is doubtful 
whether in the absence of carefully worded constitutional provisions providing 
for this, the actual implementation of a constitution would in itself facilitate the 
emergence of an independent judiciary. At this critical stage of Africa’s fragile 
democratic transition, when the chances of backsliding are quite high, a 
constitutional commitment to judicial independence may provide the climate 
for genuine democracy, political stability and respect for the rule of law.   
 
THE MEANING OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
 
Despite the abundant literature on the subject,7 there is no consensus 
amongst scholars on what exactly is meant by judicial independence. The main 
definitional problem is that judicial independence is a relative, and not an 
absolute concept. It does not refer to a single kind of relationship or something 
that a judicial system “has” or “does not have,” but rather what it may have 
“more of it” or “less of it.”8
Be that as it may, most scholars do agree that a truly independent judiciary 
must have at least three characteristics viz, first, that it is impartial, second, that 
its decisions are accepted by all and third, that it is free from undue influence. 
To this three, must be added a fourth, that it must be capable of rendering 
justice on all issues of substantial legal and constitutional importance.9 From 
6 See, C.J. Friedrich, The impact of the American constitution abroad. Boston, Boston 
University Press (1967), at p 145. 
7 See in particular, Christopher M. Larkins, “Judicial independence and 
democratization: A theoretical and conceptual analysis,” 44 American Journal of 
Comparative Law (1996), 608-611. 
8 See, The Asian Development Bank, Judicial independence project, “Judicial 
independence overview and country-level summaries,” 
9 Adopted from the definition of Christopher M. Larkins, op cit at p 611. 
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this perspective, an independent judiciary can be defined as one that is free to 
render justice on all issues of substantial legal and constitutional importance, 
fairly, impartially, in accordance with the law, without threat, fear of reprisal, 
intimidation or any other undue influence or consideration. 
Impartiality encompasses the idea that judges should be both individually 
and collectively autonomous and base their decisions purely on the law and the 
facts and not yield to any pressure from the parties. At the heart of judicial 
autonomy is the need for judges to be able to act as neutral third parties with no 
bias towards the parties irrespective of their economic, social and political 
status in society. The second characteristics, the need for judicial decisions once 
rendered to be respected by all, is what has been referred to as “social 
legitimacy.”10 This involves the capacity of judicial institutions to engender the 
belief that they deserve obedience and trust. It is this social trust and credibility 
in justice done and being seen to be done that justifies the state’s monopoly of 
all forms of legal force to enforce judicial decisions. The third element is the 
absence of “undue” interference or what has also been referred to as “political 
insularity.”11 Governments pose the most serious threat to judicial 
independence, not only because of their potential interest in the outcome of a 
myriad of cases but also because of the enormous power it has and can exercise 
over judges. Judges therefore need to be insulated from any threats or 
manipulation that may force them to act unjustly in favour of the state. The 
emphasis however, is on “undue influences,” whether external or internal, 
which may undermine the judge’s capacity to adjudicate in strict conformity 
with the facts and the law. Some internal influences, such as exchanges 
between judges through memoranda and conferences on a matter they are 
handling, as well as external influences, such as reliance on the critical writings 
of scholars, is not only unavoidable but desirable in the adjudication process. 
Thus, as Peter Russell rightly points out, to formulate the principle of judicial 
independence in a way that requires judges to be totally uninfluenced by 
anybody whatsoever is totally unrealistic.12 Absolute judicial insularity is 
therefore impossible and undesirable. Judges cannot operate in total isolation of 
the political system but have to be appointed or elected to their positions, paid a 
salary and made accountable as every other person in society. Judicial 
10 See, the Asian judicial independence project, op cit, at p 14. 
11 See, Owen Fiss “The limits of judicial independence,” 25 University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review (1993), 59-60. 
12 In “Towards a general theory of judicial independence,” in Peter H Russell and David 
M O’Brien, op cit, at p 12. 
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independence essentially deals with the relationships that judicial institutions 
and individual judges should or should not have with other institutions, groups 
or individuals as well as the behaviour, way of thinking and set of attitudes 
expected of judges.13 With perfect and unobstructed independence impossible, 
the challenge is usually to see how best impartial justice can be administered 
within the bounds of unavoidable judicial dependence on all political and social 
actors in society. Finally, another characteristic, often ignored, is the fact that 
the judiciary must be capable of rendering justice on all issues of substantial 
legal and constitutional importance. A judiciary can hardly be considered 
credibly independent if its jurisdiction is so narrowly defined that it is unable to 
deal with the crucial legal and constitutional issues that matter in the country. 
 
THE CHALLENGES TO A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
 
A few caveats on the general idea of attempting a comparative assessment 
of judicial independence in many countries needs to be inserted here. Although 
numerous studies have been carried out on the subject, a number of difficulties 
in accurately identifying and measuring judicial independence have been 
observed. Besides the well established fact that the idea of judicial 
independence itself is a variable “more or less” rather than a “yes or no” 
concept that does not lend itself to an easy straightforward scientific 
assessment, three particular problems need to be noted. 
First, there is often a difficulty with interpreting the evidence of 
impartiality, insularity and the scope of a judiciary’s authority as an 
institution.14 The constitution of a country might well guarantee judges a high 
degree of independence but restrict the scope of their authority to regulate the 
legality of the government’s behaviour in certain sensitive areas and thus 
undermine the effectiveness of the judiciary. The best and often cited example 
of this is the Spanish judiciary under the authoritarian regime of Francisco 
Franco. Although the judiciary was relatively free from political interference, 
many politically-sensitive issues such as labour policy, economic and 
commercial matters and certain aspects of criminal procedure, were reserved to 
be handled by special courts which the regime could count on to support its 
13 See, ibid at 3-9 
14 This point is forcefully developed by Christopher M. Larkins, op cit, at 611-612. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
22 
                                                     
interests.15 In the constitutions of almost all Francophone and Luxophone 
African countries, all questions dealing with the control of the constitutionality 
of laws are exclusively reserved for special constitutional tribunals, which are 
basically quasi-administrative bodies often composed of political appointees 
who are apt to deliver decisions favourable to the government. It is also these 
partisan bodies that are often given the powers to handle the frequent electoral 
disputes that have usually arisen after most of the post-1990 multiparty 
elections that have taken place. The major problem that this has given rise to in 
these countries is that there is as a result no effective and efficient mechanism 
for ensuring that the rights and privileges provided for and protected by the 
constitution are not violated. This also makes it difficult to draw any firm 
conclusions on the formal guarantees of judicial independence since these could 
be violated with impunity by the government. 
A second problem inheres from the fact that courts do not exist or operate 
in a vacuum but are subject to some democratic restrictions that inevitably 
restrict their independence and scope of authority. Most constitutions usually 
allow restrictions to be imposed in certain circumscribed emergency situations, 
such as the outbreak of war, civil insurrection and grave natural disasters. The 
frequent and prolonged declaration of states of emergencies in many African 
countries often substantially undermines the ability of the judiciary to operate 
independently especially in dealing with human rights violations.16 The quality 
of judicial independence in any country will therefore depend on the nature of 
restrictions that may be imposed to deal with emergencies or other special 
situations that may arise and how often the power to impose these restrictions is 
exercised. 
Another factor is that assessment difficulties are often compounded by 
some general structural and contextual issues such as the poor training of the 
judiciary, the poor quality or unavailability of legal services, the inadequacy of 
courtroom facilities, the lack of essential material resources and a host of other 
logistical issues, all of which directly or indirectly impact on judicial 
independence. Because these factors may or may not be present to the same 
extent in the different countries, merely looking at the legal framework for 
judicial independence alone without taking into account these factors may not 
give a fairly accurate picture. 
15 Ibid 612-613. 
16 For a discussion of the effects of extensive powers to impose a state of emergency, 
see Charles Manga Fombad, “Cameroon’s emergency powers: A recipe for 
(un)constitutional dictatorship?” 48 Journal of African Law (2004), 62-81. 
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A number of studies have suggested that some of the difficulties that have 
arisen in making an accurate comparative assessment of the standards of 
judicial independence in different countries could be overcome by looking at 
the outcome of courts or through a careful interpretative exercise in which the 
structural conditions of the courts are analysed along with the judiciary’s 
functional relationship with other political institutions.17 Although this is 
useful, it is unlikely going to produce a result that will be more accurate. It is 
doubtful whether it could ever be possible to develop a system of study that 
would produce an exact and accurate result. It is therefore suggested that what 
may more usefully be done is to assess the “prospects” for, rather than the 
actual “existence” of judicial independence. By focusing such an analysis on 
the constitutional provisions, one will be looking at legal rules that set 
standards that are less vulnerable to frequent changes and governmental 
manipulation. 
 
THE BASIC ELEMENTS FOR GAUGING THE PROSPECTS 
FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
 
Diverse approaches to judicial independence 
 
Current African constitutional developments continue to be shaped and 
influenced by the Western constitutional models that were inherited from the 
colonial period. Although before 1990 and since then, there have been 
significant changes to the constitutions that were adopted at independence, 
these changes have by and large not substantially altered the received models. 
The British parliamentary or Westminster model, which has been widely 
adopted in Africa, was actually designed by the Colonial Office in London, and 
introduced with slight variations to the different former British colonies. The 
other leading model, the Gaullist model, developed in Paris and based on the 
Constitution of the French Fifth Republic, was also introduced with slight 
changes to most Francophone African countries. A variation of the Gaullist 
model, which reflects the continental Civil law system, has been adopted by 
Luxophone African countries. It is also worth noting that elements of the 
American presidential model have been grafted upon the Westminster model 
adopted in some of the Anglophone African countries. We shall however, 
briefly examine only the British and French models, both archetypical of the 
17 Ibid  618-619. 
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Common Law and Civil Law approaches that have widely been copied in 
Africa. 
Although England is usually regarded as the cradle of the ideal of judicial 
independence, the judiciary in England is neither a separate nor co-equal branch 
of government. In fact, the very concept of judicial independence in the English 
system has been described as an “inchoate one.”18 Nevertheless, the English 
have developed an essentially informal but effective system of judicial 
independence that largely relies on the congeries of statutes, delegated 
legislation, custom and convention. Historically, the Act of Settlement of 1701, 
which provided that judges were not to be dismissed without addresses by both 
houses of Parliament, is usually considered to be the basis of judicial 
independence in England. Over the centuries, the British reputation for the high 
standards of judicial independence, marked by such conventional hallmarks as 
security of tenure, fiscal independence, impartiality and freedom from 
executive pressure, is due largely to a strong political culture that has 
consistently provided protection for the judiciary. 
By contrast, the French model of judicial independence has been 
substantially shaped by the obsessive Gallic fear of legal dictatorship through a 
“government of judges.”19 This approach can be traced to pre-revolutionary 
France. Because of the bad reputation of royal courts or Parlements before the 
French revolution, one of the first measures that the revolutionaries took was to 
break the powers of these courts by subordinating them to the complete control 
of the executive. Article 64 of the 1958 Constitution of the French Fifth 
Republic reflects this mistrust of the judiciary when it states that the “President 
of the Republic is the guardian of the independence of the judiciary,” clearly 
suggesting that the judiciary is not on the same par as the executive but rather 
below it. This conclusion is reinforced by the powers given to the President to 
appoint, promote, transfer and dismiss judicial personnel. Although in doing so, 
he is supposed to receive advice from the Higher Judicial Council, a body 
whose composition and proceedings he controls, this does not disguise the fact 
that judicial independence is thereby substantially compromised. 
18 Robert Stevens, “Judicial independence in England: A loss of innocence,” in Peter H 
Russell and David M O’Brien, op cit, at p 155. 
19 See, Dennis Tallon, “The constitution and the courts in France,” 27 American 
Journal of Comparative Law (1979), 567-575; John Henry Merryman, “The French 
deviation,” 44 American Journal of Comparative Law (1996), 109-114; and Michael H. 
Davis, “The law/politics distinction, the French Conseil Constitutionnnel, and the US 
Supreme Court,” 34 American Journal of Comparative Law (1986), 45-92. 
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Basic elements of judicial independence 
 
The general movement by many former African authoritarian regimes 
towards liberal democracy, which has as one of its essential attributes, an 
independent judiciary, raises the question whether there are any minimum 
conditions or basic elements that must be present for the judiciary in any given 
country to be classified as independent. Although, even in the liberal 
democracies, such as in Britain and France, as we just saw above, there are 
differences in approach, there appears to be emerging certain factors that can be 
categorised as basic elements for gauging the extent to which the prospects for 
judicial independence in a given country are good or bad. 
Various governmental and non-governmental guidelines have been drafted 
internationally and regionally by experts aimed at fleshing out and agreeing on 
what could be considered as the basic elements of judicial independence.20 
Although these documents are not binding, they nevertheless provide evidence 
of a high level of support for what may be regarded as certain universally 
agreed core elements of judicial independence. 
A number of international and regional instruments make general reference 
to the concept of judicial independence.21 Under the aegis of the United 
Nations, a number of recommendations have been adopted to clarify the 
meaning and scope of the notion of judicial independence as guaranteed under 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. This is contained in the United 
Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, which calls on 
member states to guarantee judicial independence domestically through 
20 For a detailed discussion of this, see Violaine Autheman, “Global best practices: 
judicial integrity standards and consensus principles,” IFES Rule of Law White Paper 
Series, 
http://66.249.93.104/search?q=cache:TVdXJQ6CriwJ:www.ifes.org/searchable/ifes_sit
e/... 
21 See for example, Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948; 
Article 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966; Article 
6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 1950; Article 8(1) of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, 
1969; and Article 7(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981. 
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constitutional or legal provisions and highlights certain standards for attaining 
judicial independence. 22
At a regional level, there have also been several initiatives. In Africa, the 
African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights, established under the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981, after recalling that 
justice is a core element of democracy, adopted a Recommendation on the 
Respect and Strengthening of the Independence of the Judiciary in 1996.23 The 
Recommendation calls upon member states of the African Union to meet 
certain minimum standards to guarantee the independence of the judiciary on 
the continent. These include sufficient resources, adequate working and living 
conditions for judges, and the recognition of universal principles of judicial 
independence. It is also worth noting that in Europe, there are two documents 
that also seek to clarify the concept of judicial independence and set out its core 
elements viz, the Recommendation No. R (94)12 on the Independence, 
Efficiency and Role of Judges, 1993,24 and the European Charter on the Status 
of Judges, 1998.25
A good number of other guidelines and principles have been adopted by 
legal experts and judges from a variety of groups ranging from judges and bar 
associations to international jurist conferences. These efforts have been made 
either at an international level or at regional level.26 For international attempts, 
the following need to be noted: 
 
i) The Syracuse Principles of 1981.27 
 
ii) The New Delhi Standards of 1982.28 
22 These principles were adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held in Milan. See 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h.comp50.htm
23 See African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights, 19th Session, 03/26-
04/04/1996, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. 
24 Adopted during the 518 meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, Council of Europe, 
http://cm.coe.int/ta/rec/1994/94r12.htm
25 See, DAC/DOJ (98) 23, 07/08 – 10/1998, Strasbourg, Council of Europe. 
26 See, Violaine Autheman, op cit at p 5. 
27 The Syracuse Draft Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary was prepared by 
a Committee of Jurists and the International Commission of Jurists at Syracuse, Sicily 
on 25-29 May 1981. 
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iii) The Montreal Universal Declaration on the Independence of 
Justice of 1983.29 
 
iv) The Universal Charter of the Judge of 1999. 30 
 
v) The Bangalore principles of Judicial Conduct of 2002.31 
 
For regional efforts, there is in Asia, the Tokyo Principles of 198232 and the 
Beijing Principles of 1995.33 In Europe, there is the Judges’ Charter in Europe 
of 1993,34 in Latin America, there is the Caracas Declaration of 199835 and in 
the Middle East, there is the Beirut Declaration of 1999.36
 
28 See, Article 78(2), Namibian Constitution of 1990, 
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/was00000_.html  All subsequent references to the 
Namibian Constitution should be understood as referring to this Constitution. 
29 The Montreal Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice was adopted 
during the 1983 World Conference on the Independence of justice 
http://66.249.93.104/search?q=cache:TVdXJQ6CriwJ:www.ifes.org/searchable/ifes_sit
e/PDF/rule_of_law/ROL_Tool_Kit/WhitePaper_1_FINAL.pdf+montreal+universal+de
claration+on+the+independence+of+justice&hl=en
30 See, The Universal Charter of the Judge was adopted in 1999 by the International 
Association of Judges, which brings together national association of judges from 
around the world. 
 http://www.iaj-uim.org/ENG/07.html
31 The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct was adopted by the Judicial Group on 
Strengthening Judicial Integrity as revised at the Round table meeting of Chief Justices 
held at the Hague, Netherlands in 2002. 
32 The Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA 
Region, 1982 was adopted in Tokyo, Japan by LAWASIA Human Rights Standing 
Committee. 
33 The Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA 
Region, was adopted in Beijing in 1995 during a Conference of Chief Justices of Asia 
and the Pacific Region. 
34 The Judges’ Charter in Europe was adopted in 1993 by the European Association of 
Judges. 
35 The Caracas Declaration was adopted during the Ibero-American Summit of 
Presidents of Supreme Justice Tribunals and Courts, in Caracas, Venezuela in 1998. 
36 The Recommendations of the First Arab Conference on Justice, was adopted during a 
conference on the judiciary in the Arab region and the challenges in the 21st century in 
Beirut, Lebanon. 
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From these diverse declarations and statements, the core elements of 
judicial independence that seem to be internationally recognised can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
i) institutional arrangements for judicial autonomy; 
 
ii) financial arrangements for judicial autonomy; 
 
iii) arrangements for the security of the judicial office; 
 
iv) adequate remuneration of judicial officers; 
 
v) transparent mechanism for judicial appointments; and 
 
vi) judicial accountability.37 
 
POST 1990 AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
 
It is now necessary to see to what extent the above core elements of judicial 
independence that are now universally recognised are reflected in some of the 
post-1990 African constitutions. It is worthwhile pointing out that it is the 
combined effect of these elements taken as a whole which may provide a basis 
for judging whether or not, the prospects for judicial independence in any given 
country are good. Thus, the absence of one element may be sufficiently serious 
to compromise the chances of the judiciary operating independently. However, 
the constitutional regime type, whether it is the Westminster, Gaullist or some 
hybrid must always be borne in mind because this serves to explain the 
variations in approaches. 
 
Institutional arrangements for judicial autonomy 
 
The principle of judicial autonomy is considered as a cornerstone of 
judicial independence and must ideally be enshrined in the constitution or some 
other laws of the country. It encompasses a number of important rules. These 
37 These are fully discussed by Luu Tien Dung, “Judicial independence in transitional 
countries,” http://www.undporg/oslocentre/dvcsjuly03/DungTienLuu-v2.pdf
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include the rule that judges must be impartial and free to decide cases on the 
basis of the facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, 
improper influences, inducements, pressures, and threats, direct or indirect from 
any quarters or for any reasons. It also requires the judiciary to have jurisdiction 
over all issues of a judicial nature and the exclusive authority to determine 
whether or not, an issue submitted for its decision is within its competence as 
defined by law.38 Autonomy also requires that the judiciary should be seen to 
be independent of any undue external influences such as pressure from the 
legislature, executive, political parties, and the legal profession as well as 
internal pressure from horizontal and vertical bosses. Impartiality requires that 
in acting, judges should be influenced by the law and their conscience only. 
Judicial autonomy is recognised and protected in different ways by the 
different African constitutions. The 1996 South African Constitution39 deals 
with this in fairly unambiguous and elaborate terms in Section 165, which 
states: 
 
1. “The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts. 
 
2. The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution 
and the law, which they must apply impartially and without fear, 
favour or prejudice. 
 
3. No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of 
the courts. 
 
4. Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must 
assist and protect the courts to ensure the independence, 
impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts. 
 
5. An order or decision issued by a court binds all persons to whom 
and organs of state to which it applies.” 
 
A similar approach is adopted in Article 78 of the Namibian Constitution, 
which also states that the courts are independent and subject only to the 
38 See, Principles 1-3 of the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary, op cit. 
39 See Act 108 of 1996, and its amendments. All references to the South African 
Constitution, should be understood as referring to this Constitution. 
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Constitution and the law.40 It also states that “no member of the Cabinet or the 
legislature or any other person shall interfere with judges or judicial officers in 
the exercise of their judicial functions,” and imposes a duty on all organs of the 
state to accord such assistance as the courts may require to protect their 
independence, dignity and effectiveness.41 The decisions of courts are declared 
to be binding on all unless “contradicted by an Act of Parliament lawfully 
enacted.”42 The Ghanaian Constitution also contains elaborate provisions 
recognising and protecting the impartiality and autonomy of the judiciary in 
terms which are very similar to those in the Namibian Constitution.43 With 
perhaps less details, but also designed to ensure judicial autonomy, are a 
number of provisions in the Angolan44 and Mozambican45 Constitutions. 
The approach adopted in the above constitutions, which differs from that of 
other Anglophone African countries mainly in the details, is in sharp contrast 
with that adopted in the constitutions of Francophone African countries. A 
typical example of the latter is the 1996 amended Cameroon Constitution of 
1972.46 Judicial autonomy is treated in the same ambivalent and contradictory 
manner that the French Fifth Republic Constitution treats it. Article 37(2) of the 
Cameroon Constitution states that “the judicial power shall be independent of 
the executive and legislative powers,” and that judges in discharging their 
duties shall be governed by the law and their conscience. Any expectations that 
this recognises and protects judicial impartiality and autonomy are quickly 
dispelled by Article 37(3), which states that the “President of the Republic shall 
40 See, Article 78(2), Namibian Constitution of 1990, 
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/was00000_.html  All subsequent references to the 
Namibian Constitution should be understood as referring to this Constitution. 
41 See, Article 78(3), Namibian Constitution ibid. 
42 See, Article 81 ibid. 
43 See, Articles 125 (3) and (5) and 127 (1) and (2) of the Ghanaian Constitution of 
1992, PN.D.C.L. 282. All subsequent references to the Ghanaian Constitution should be 
taken as referring to this Constitution. 
44 See, Articles 120, 121 and 123 of the Angolan Constitution of 1992, 
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ao00000_.html, all subsequent references to the 
Angolan Constitution should be taken as references to this Constitution. 
45 See, Articles 161, 162 and 164 of the Mozambican Constitution of 1990, 
http://confinder.richmond.edu/MOZ.htm , all subsequent references to the Mozambican 
Constitution, should be taken as references to this Constitution. 
46 See, Law No. 06 of 18 January 1996 to amend the Constitution of 2 June 1972.  All 
subsequent references to the Cameroon Constitution should be taken as referring to this 
Constitution. 
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guarantee the independence of judicial power.” This clearly indicates that rather 
than being co-equals, the judiciary is subordinate to the executive, which 
therefore raises doubts about its ability to operate without undue executive 
interference and pressure. This approach has been adopted in the Constitutions 
of most other Francophone African countries.47
 
Financial arrangements for judicial autonomy 
 
Without adequate resources, it is unlikely that a judiciary can function 
with any degree of independence and impartiality. The United Nations Basic 
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary make it a duty on each member 
state to provide adequate resources to enable the judiciary to properly perform 
its functions.48 This raises mainly the issue of the process of preparing and 
decision-making on the budget of the judiciary. As Nicholson points out, “the 
preparation of judicial estimates by anyone not acting under the direction of the 
judiciary and the exercise of control by the government over the way in which 
the courts expend the funds granted to them necessarily poses a potential threat 
to judicial independence.”49 There are two main approaches that appear to have 
emerged in preparing judicial budget estimations. The first approach is for the 
executive to prepare the budget in collaboration with the judiciary. The second 
approach, which has been followed in a number of African countries, is for the 
judiciary to prepare the budget and submit it to the executive who may amend it 
before presenting it to parliament.50 This appears to suggest that the judiciary is 
beginning to gain some influence and command over the judicial budget 
allocation process. 
One of the few countries that say something in its constitution about the 
role of the judiciary in the budget allocation process is Uganda. However, all it 
states in Article 128(6) of the Constitution is that the judiciary “shall be self-
accounting and may deal directly with the Ministry of finance in relation to its 
47 See, Articles 89 (1) and (2) and 90 of the Mauritanian Constitution of 1991, 
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/mr00000_.html  all subsequent references to the 
Mauritanian 
48 Op cit, in Article 7. 
49 In, “Judicial independence and accountability: Can they co-exist?” Australia Law 
Journal (1993), at p 404. 
50 See, Luu Tien Dung, op cit at p17. 
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finances.”51 The absence of more precise constitutional provisions, such as 
exists in some Latin American countries, such as Costa Rica, where the budget 
for the judiciary is guaranteed as a percentage of the national budget in the 
Constitution, has often made it easy for the judicial budget of African countries 
to be reduced for purely political reasons.52
 
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SECURITY OF THE JUDICIAL 
OFFICE 
 
The problem of the security of judicial office raises three important issues 
viz, the tenure of judicial office, the grounds for removal and the process for the 
removal or discipline of judicial officers. These critical issues need to be clearly 
addressed, preferably in the constitution, or in some other law of the country. 
 
The tenure of judicial office 
 
Security of tenure substantially contributes to insulating judges from 
external pressure and has rightly been regarded as a sine qua non of judicial 
independence. Judicial tenures that are too short or mandatory retirement ages 
at relatively young age could undermine the prestige as well as the institutional 
independence of the judiciary. An appointment for life or for such fixed period 
that does not endanger the judges’ independence is desirable. 
African constitutional approaches vary within two main systems; a career 
judiciary and non-career judiciary. Francophone African countries have adopted 
the former, which involves the selection, appointment and promotion of judges 
from within a judicial or civil service career system. This therefore gives 
judicial officers life tenure. 
Most Anglophone African countries have a non-career system which 
involves the selection, appointment and promotion of judges by the executive 
or legislature or a combination of both, with or without the involvement of 
some stakeholders, such as the Law Society. There are however wide variations 
which sometimes depend on the duration of the appointment and the level of 
the court in the hierarchy of courts. Most judges are appointed to serve until 60 
51 See Ugandan Constitution of 1995, http://www.parliament/go.ug/Constitute.htm , all 
subsequent references to the Ugandan Constitution should be taken as references to this 
Constitution. 
52 See, Luu Tien Dung, op cit, at p 18. 
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or 65 years, but there is always a provision that this could be extended by five 
years.53
 
Disciplinary and removal grounds 
 
As Peter Russell aptly puts it, “judicial independence is less at risk at the 
front end of the personnel process – the appointing end – if there is a strong 
system of judicial tenure at the back end – the removal end.”54 Arbitrary and 
opaque procedures for disciplining and removing judges could easily 
undermine the independence of the courts. Whilst judges and other judicial 
personnel, like every other public officer, should be subject to disciplinary 
measures such as suspension or removal, the grounds that have generally been 
recognised as legitimate are reasons of incapacity or behaviour that renders 
them unfit to discharge their duties.55 Removal should be made difficult in 
order to prevent any abuses, so both the concept of incapacity and 
misbehaviour should be interpreted in a strict manner. Incapacity should be 
restricted to cases of physical or mental constraints that make judges incapable 
of carrying out adjudication, whilst misbehaviour should only refer to crimes or 
offences or gross and repeated acts of neglect that makes the judge unfit to 
discharge his responsibilities. 
Indirect sanctions, such as transfers to remote parts of the country or 
secondment to an obscure position, have regularly been used as a hidden tool to 
punish judges. The only way that this can be checked is to state in the law that 
53 For example, in Article 291(2) of the Nigerian Constitution of 1999, states that 
ordinary judges should retire at 60 but the term could be extended to allow them retire 
at 65 years, whilst the retirement age of the Supreme Court judges is 65 but this could 
be extended to allow them hold office until they are 70, http://www.nigeria-
law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm , all subsequent references to 
the Nigerian Constitution should be taken as references to this Constitution.  In the 
Ugandan Constitution, Article 144(1)(a) whilst providing that judicial officers should 
vacate their offices at 60, allows the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and Justices of 
the Supreme Court to hold office until 70 years. In the South African Constitution, the 
only term of office that is defined is that of judges of the Constitutional Court. 
According to Section 176, on appointment,  they hold office for a non-renewable term 
of 12 years but must retire at the age of 70. 
54 Op cit  at p16. 
55 See, Principle 18 of the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary. 
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judges shall not be transferred or seconded to another position or court, without 
their consent or through a procedure that is fair and transparent. 
The issue of disciplining and removing judges is particularly important at 
this critical stage of the democratic transition in Africa, where judges play an 
important role in election disputes. The standards and grounds for disciplining 
and removing judges vary considerably. Even then, it is still possible to note 
that most Anglophone African constitutions often contain detailed provisions 
quite similar to those in the United Nations Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary.56 One example will suffice. In the Ghanaian 
Constitution, Article 146(1) states that the judges of the superior courts or 
Chairpersons of regional tribunals shall not be removed from office except for 
“stated misbehaviour or incompetence or on ground of inability to perform the 
functions of [their] …office arising from infirmity of body or mind.”57 There 
are similar provisions in the Botswana, Namibian, Nigerian, South African and 
Ugandan Constitutions.58
By way of contrast, the constitutions in most Francophone and Luxophone 
African countries merely mention the possibility of disciplinary measures being 
taken against judges and other judicial officers but reserves the details on this 
for subsequent laws.59 The difficulty with such an approach is that there is no 
guarantee that such laws will conform to the minimum standards that ensure 
transparency and prevent any unwarranted interference with the judiciary. 
 
 
 
56 See Principles 18-20, loc. cit 
57 The situation with respect to the removal of other judicial officers is covered by 
Article 151(1). 
58 See, Section 97(2) of the Botswana Constitution of 1966, as amended in 2002; 
Article 84(2) of the Namibian Constitution; Section 292(1) of the Nigerian 
Constitution; Section 177(1) of the South African Constitution and Article 144(1) of the 
Ugandan Constitution. 
59 For Francophone countries, see Article 37(3) of the Cameroon Constitution; Article 
82 of the Malian Constitution; Article 87 of the Moroccan Constitution; and Article 70 
of the Gabonese Constitution of 1994, 
http://www.bdpgabon.org/gouvernement/constitution.shtml , all subsequent references 
to the Gabonese Constitution, should be taken as referring to this Constitution. For 
Luxophone countries, see Article 128 of the Angolan Constitution. 
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DUE PROCESS OF REMOVAL AND DISCIPLINE 
 
There is now consensus that the best way to prevent the misuse of 
disciplinary measures against the judiciary is to clearly lay down in advance the 
procedure to be followed and subject this to an independent judicial review.60 
The disciplinary process must be transparent, fair, and accessible and include 
the procedure for filing complaints, carrying out investigations and decision-
making. Judicial officers have a right to a fair hearing before a decision-making 
body, which should be independent, especially from the executive. It is 
particularly important that such a decision-making body is not dominated by 
the executive or appointees of the executive and it should have representatives 
from non-judicial institutions to ensure that the judiciary is not totally isolated 
from the general public. Representatives of judges from all levels of the 
judiciary are also needed to ensure that the process is not controlled or 
dominated only by senior judges. 
A close analysis of the constitutional provisions dealing with the due 
process of removal and discipline again shows a remarkable difference in the 
practice between Francophone and Anglophone African states. In the former, 
the provisions are generally brief, and do not provide any clear and transparent 
procedures. The best example of a fairly transparent system is provided for by 
the South African Constitution. Section 177(1) states that: 
  
1. a judge may be removed from office only if: 
 
(a) the Judicial Service Commission finds that the 
judge suffers from an incapacity, is grossly 
incompetent or is guilty of gross misconduct; and 
(b) the National Assembly calls for that judge to be 
removed by a resolution adopted with a supporting 
vote of at least two thirds of its members. 
 
2. The President must remove a judge from office upon adoption of 
a resolution calling for that judge to be removed. 
 
60 See, Principle 20, United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary, op cit 
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3. The President, on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission, 
may suspend a judge who is the subject of a procedure in terms 
of subsection (1).” 
 
What is particularly significant and novel is the composition of the Judicial 
Service Commission.61 First, its meetings are presided over by the Chief 
Justice. Second, although it is composed of 24 members, the executive is 
directly represented by one member, the Cabinet member responsible for the 
administration of justice or his representative.62 The President as head of the 
national executive may designate four persons, but he must in doing so, consult 
the leaders of all the parties in the National Assembly. Third, the Constitution 
makes it clear that the decisions of the Commission are to be arrived at by a 
majority of its members, to ensure that an influential minority can not impose 
its will on the majority. This pattern is replicated in the Constitutions of other 
Anglophone countries such as Ghana, Namibia and Uganda.63
Meanwhile, in most Francophone African constitutions, the President as 
“guarantor of the independence” of the independence decides all disciplinary 
actions to be taken against judges and other judicial officers. In doing so, these 
constitutions state that, the President will be “assisted” by the Higher Judicial 
Council, or a similar body, which is only required to “give him its opinion.”  
The details on the organisation and functioning of these “advisory bodies” are 
usually left to be defined by subsequent laws. In practice, these bodies are 
mainly composed of Presidential appointees and the meetings are presided over 
61 See, Section 178 of the South African Constitution. 
62 See, Section 178(1)(d). 
63 See, Articles 146-148 of the Ghanaian Constitution; Articles 84-85 of the Namibian 
Constitution; and Articles 144-147, 151-154 of the Ugandan Constitution. A slightly 
different approach is provided for in the Botswana Constitution, where Sections 97(3) 
and 101(3) provide that if the President considers that the question of removing a judge 
ought to be investigated, he should appoint a tribunal to investigate the matter and 
advise him as to whether or not the judge ought to be removed.  Although not entirely 
satisfactory because the President alone is given the powers not only to decide whether 
or not there ought to be an investigation, but also to determine the composition of the 
tribunal to conduct the enquiry, the main safeguard against any abuse is Sections 97(2) 
and 101(2) of the Constitution, which lay down a clear and objective criteria for any 
removal. 
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by the President himself, with his Minister of Justice acting as Vice 
Chairman.64
 
Adequate remuneration of judicial officers 
 
The independence of judges and other judicial officers can be seriously put 
in jeopardy if the remuneration they receive is so inadequate that they are 
readily open to bribery or compromising business overtures. Such remuneration 
needs to be secured by law to prevent them from being arbitrarily decreased, 
unless this is done as part of an overall economic measure every worker. 
Generally, only the constitutions of Anglophone African countries 
address the issue of judicial remuneration. These often provide that judicial 
salaries, including allowances, gratuities and pensions are to be charged on the 
Consolidated Fund.65 Some even go further to state that the salaries and other 
financial benefits shall not be varied to the disadvantage of judicial officers.66 
Although this means nothing more than that judicial benefits should not be 
varied in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner, the idea behind protecting 
their benefits is to ensure that they maintain a minimally respectable standard of 
living commensurate to their level of responsibilities and status. 
 
Transparent mechanism for judicial appointments 
 
The mechanism for appointing judges plays a very important role in 
ensuring a properly functioning and independent judiciary. The emphasis is on 
an appointment process that is based on an objective and transparent criteria 
that relies on factors such as qualification, competence and integrity.67 There 
are three main systems of appointments viz, election by the people, 
appointment by elected politicians and appointment into a professional career 
judiciary. There are however various variants of used in Africa. 
64 See for example, Article 37 (3) of the Cameroon Constitution; and Articles 70-71 of 
the Gabonese Constitution. 
65 See for example, Section 122 of the Botswana Constitution, Article 127(4) and(5) of 
the Ghanaian Constitution, and Section 176(3) of the South African Constitution. 
66 See for example, Article 128(5) and (6) of the Ugandan Constitution. 
67 See, Principles 11-12 of the Beijing Statements of the Independence of the Judiciary, 
op cit; Article 9 of the Universal Charter of the Judge op cit; and Principle 10 of the 
United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, op cit. 
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Most Anglophone African countries follow the Common Law practice that 
requires that judicial candidates should have practised for a specified minimum 
number of years as advocates, barristers or attorneys before they qualify to be 
considered for appointment as judges.68 The Civil Law professional career path 
approach adopted by most Francophone African countries means that potential 
candidates for judicial appointments, have to write and pass a competitive 
examination to go into a school of magistracy where they are trained in judicial 
skills for a period usually lasting two years. Upon entry into such an institution, 
the candidate is immediately integrated into the civil service and on graduation 
may be appointed to serve either as a judge or state prosecutor. 
Generally, the constitutions of most Anglophone states clearly spell out in 
some detail the criteria as well as lay down a transparent procedure for 
appointments. In both Anglophone and Francophone African constitutions, the 
actual appointment is made by the executive. This is however based on a 
“recommendation” by a Judicial Service Commission or similar body, in the 
case of the former, or the “opinion” of a Higher Judicial Council or similar 
body, in the case of the latter. A significant difference is that the executive 
dominates the appointment process in the Higher Judicial Councils in 
Francophone Africa but not in the Judicial Service Commissions in 
Anglophone Africa. 
Perhaps one of the most transparent appointment procedures is provided in 
the South African Constitution. It underscores the need for the judiciary to 
reflect the racial and gender composition of the South African society.69 Section 
174(3) provides that the President as head of the executive, appoints the 
President and Deputy President of the Constitutional Court, after consulting the 
Judicial Service Commission and the leaders of parties represented in the 
National Assembly, but appoints the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice 
after consulting the Judicial Service Commission. The other judges of the 
Constitutional Court are also appointed by the President after consultations with 
the leaders of parties represented in the National Assembly following an 
elaborate procedure in which he is required to select the judges from a list of 
nominees submitted to him by the Judicial Service Commission.70 The 
President appoints judges of all the other courts on the advice of the Judicial 
68 See for example, Article 128(4) of the Ghanaian Constitution and Article 143(1) of 
the Ugandan Constitution. 
69 See, Section 174 (2). 
70 See, Section 174 (4). 
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Service Commission.71 As we noted earlier, the Judicial Service Commission is 
constituted in such a manner that very few of its 24 members are appointed by 
the executive. This shows how a carefully structured mechanism for judicial 
appointment can combine transparency and pluralism in a manner that may 
totally preclude all the negative aspects of executive interference, but could 
certainly limit the possibilities of such interference. In Nigeria, the 
appointments of federal judges is also made by the President, as head of the 
federal executive, acting on the recommendations of the National Judicial 
Council but this is subject to confirmation by the Senate.72 For state judges, the 
appointments are made by the Governors, in their capacity as head of the state 
executives, acting on the recommendations of the National Judicial Council and 
subject to confirmation by the House of Assembly of the State.73 In Botswana, 
judges are appointed by the President acting on the advice of the Judicial 
Service Commission,74 but rather oddly, in appointing the Chief Justice, who is 
head of the judiciary and the President of the Court of Appeal, the highest court 
in the country, he acts alone.75
The constitution of a typical Francophone African state provides that judges 
are to be appointed by the President of the Republic, “assisted” in this task by a 
Higher Judicial Council or similar body, which as noted above is dominated by 
executive appointees and only plays the role of  “giving”  the President its 
“opinion.”76  A marked departure from the two patterns discussed so far, is that 
found in the Mozambican and Angolan Constitutions. The Mozambican 
Constitution provides for both professional and elected judges. The former are 
to be appointed by the President after consultations with the Supreme Council 
of the Judiciary,77 whilst the latter are to be elected by Parliament, the 
Assembly of the Republic.78 An indication that the elected judges need not be 
legally trained is given by Article 171(1) of the Constitution, which states that 
only the professional judges may decide “matters of law,” and the role of the 
71 See, Section 174 (6). 
72 See, Sections 231-269 of the Nigerian Constitution. 
73 See, Sections 270-274 ibid. 
74 See, Sections 96(2) and (3) and 100(2) of the Botswana Constitution as amended in 
2002. 
75 See, Sections 96(1) and 100(1) ibid. 
76 See for example, Article 37(3) of the Cameroon Constitution, Article 82 of the 
Malian Constitution and Article 84 of the Moroccan Constitution. 
77 See, Article 170(1) of the Mozambican Constitution. 
78 See, Article 170(4) ibid. 
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elected judges is reserved to participating in pre-trial hearings. Something very 
similar is provided for in Article 122 of the Angolan Constitution, which 
provides for professional judges as well as “citizens assistants.” The major 
drawback of some of these constitutional provisions that allow too much 
leeway to executives that are prone to interference is that the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary is put at great risk. 
 
Judicial accountability 
 
The growth of judicial powers in liberal democracies has been accompanied 
by demands for new forms of judicial accountability.79 In Africa, the general 
perception of a high rate of judicial corruption has made the issue of judicial 
accountability is very important.80 Judicial accountability deals with the extent 
to which, judges whilst being free to decide cases fairly and impartially, can 
still be made accountable for any serious misconduct. Judicial insulation, which 
goes with judicial independence, does not mean that judges should be left 
entirely to their own devices to exploit their positions for private gain. In fact, 
judicial accountability goes hand in hand with judicial independence but a 
careful balance must be worked out between the two so that one does not 
undermine the other. It has been argued that the more independent judiciaries 
are, the more accountability should be provided to prevent any abuses, provided 
that the degree of accountability does not endanger their independence.81
The key to judicial accountability appears to be transparency. This requires 
an open and efficient process for dealing with important issues such as 
discipline, suspension, removal  and demotion of judges. As we have seen, 
some of the processes provided by many constitutions are so executive-
dominated that misconduct could either be sanctioned or covered up which ever 
of this best suits the executive at a particular moment. In those countries where 
the selection and appointment process as well as the process for dealing with 
judicial misconduct is transparent, such as is the case under the South African 
Constitution, the judiciary is more likely to employ competent, independent and 
impartial judges. 
 
79 See, Peter H. Russell, op cit at p 19. 
80 See, Luu Tien Dung, op cit at p 28. 
81 Ibid  at p 27. 
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RATIONALE FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
 
Several studies have brought out a number of arguments in support of the 
multiple benefits that come from the existence of an independent judiciary. 
Although some empirical evidence from some of these studies have suggested 
that the results are mixed,82 the symbolic significance of an independent 
judiciary, especially for transitional regimes like those in Africa cannot be 
gainsaid. 
The various arguments can be subsumed into one main pertinent point 
which is that, the constitutionalisation of a credible framework that ensures the 
independence of the judiciary signifies a clear pre-commitment to certain 
minimum standards of civilised behaviour for the respect for constitutional 
norms and the rule of law in a way that will likely promote democratic 
consolidation. For a continent almost trapped in political instability, economic 
decline and a deteriorating social order, the prospects of an independent 
judiciary may not only be reflective of a strong commitment to democracy but 
may actually be constitutive of it. It is not enough to have constitutional rules 
that for the first time open the space for political competition. Allowing 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, free elections and other similar 
paraphernalia of democracy count for little if there are no guarantees that these 
rules will be respected and non-compliance sanctioned. Only a genuinely 
independent judiciary can ensure that the rules of political competition are 
respected and that a culture of legality that ensures respect for the rule of law 
emerges. Constitutionalising government through the neutral arbitration of 
independent judges also provides for the predictability because individuals will 
know in advance how they stand with respect to the government and how far 
the latter can go in interfering with their life and activities. 
Another positive benefit that may result from an enhanced prospect of an 
independent judiciary is the possibility of accountability, certainty and 
predictability in the operation and application of the law. This will also ensure 
the recognition and enforcement of the various forms of contractual and 
property rights which could play a crucial role in attracting both domestic and 
foreign investment desperately needed in many African countries to revive their 
collapsed economies. It will also prevent the government from arbitrarily 
82 See, the Asian judicial independence project, op cit, 15-18 and  Matthew Stephenson, 
“Judicial independence: What it is, How it can be measured, Why it occurs.” 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/judicialindependence.htm
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changing laws or policies at it suit its convenience. Consistency and 
predictability, especially in the operation and enforcement of the rules on 
property rights reduces the risks of political opportunism and expediency and 
provides an incentive for investors. Many crucial matters that determine the 
decision whether or not to invest can thus be placed beyond the whims and 
caprices of transient or popular leaders and ruling majorities.  
If one of the greatest injuries of Africa’s long years of totalitarianism can 
be said to be the uncertainty that this breed, it can be argued that the 
institutionalisation of judicial independence, within a framework that offers 
good prospects for constitutionalism reduces and controls the potentially 
enormous powers of the state and ruling parties to act arbitrarily. The existence 
of an independent judiciary signals a state’s commitment to constitutionalism, 
which includes not only respect for the rule of law but also respect for human 
rights. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The constitutional reforms of the 1990s provided many African 
governments with an opportunity to adopt many of the fundamental elements 
that are now considered internationally as crucial in establishing a truly 
independent judiciary. In spite of the apparent agreement on the basic elements, 
the concept of judicial independence remains fluid and relative, and this 
explains the diverse approaches that exist. The analysis of the approach adopted 
in a number of African constitutions whilst reflecting the continuous influence 
of the inherited constitutional models shows that there has been considerable 
progress in certain countries and very little change in others. A number of 
important conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. 
The focus of any serious effort to secure the independence of the judiciary 
is considerably enhanced by entrenching detailed provisions on what are now 
accepted as its core principles in the constitution rather than in an ordinary law. 
This must be so, notwithstanding the well documented fact that Britain, Israel 
and New Zealand are operating efficiently with functioning independent 
judiciaries without any entrenched constitutional provisions. The fragility of 
Africa’s democratic transitions and the lack of an ethos, culture or history of 
constitutionalism necessitate greater clarity. Little scope should be allowed for 
any executive discretion in such matters. Constitutionalising judicial 
independence in this way is certainly no guarantee that there will be no 
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unwarranted interference by the executive with the judiciary but it will certainly 
increase the odds against such interference. 
Some countries or group of countries have gone further in enhancing the 
prospects of judicial independence than others. The analysis shows that there is 
greater scope for interference in Francophone and Luxophone African 
countries, especially because many countries in the former category, have stuck 
to the Fifth French Republic constitutional model inherited during the colonial 
period. Meanwhile, there appears to have been more serious efforts to 
modernise the Westminster model in most Anglophone countries. However, the 
South African approach, appears to offer the best prospects for judicial 
independence and can serve as a model for other African countries.   
Most of the post 1990 constitutional changes clearly suggest a greater 
political awareness and sensitivity to the need for greater openness, 
accountability, participation and representation.  Studies have shown that 
independent courts have played a major role in the widespread acceptance of 
governance in many of the advanced democracies.83  As African constitutional 
engineers grapple with the difficult task of crafting constitutions that will meet 
the needs and aspirations of the people, there is need not only to recognise the 
role and standards of judicial independence that have emerged after years of 
serious studies at both international and regional levels but also the fact it is 
time to limit the excessive and sometimes blind reliance on inherited colonial 
stereotypes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 See, Herbert Jacob, in Herbert Jacob, Erhard Blankenburg et al (eds), Courts, law, 
and politics in comparative perspective. New Haven, Yale University Press (1996), pp 
389-390. 
